Thu, May 11 at 12:04 PM
Our Man in Tokyo: An American Ambassador and the Countdown to Pearl Harbor, by Steve Kemper
Kemper's history tells the story of Joseph Grew’s 10-year stint as the American Ambassador to Japan, from 1932-1942.
Grew was a man who sought peace through diplomacy. He tried to make the best out of every situation and turn challenges into opportunities. To no avail.
Here are the most illuminating and surprising learnings I carried away from the book:
1. Japan’s expansionist drive in the 1930s on into the early 1940s was driven by the belief that it had every right to claim and rule China and Southeast Asia. It viewed itself as “the empire under the sun.” For much of its history, Japan had been a closed, isolated society. It developed its own unique culture and values under the influence of Confucianism and the Samurai culture. (There is a lot of similarity in China's view of the world today).
2. In the late 19th and early 20th century, Japan began to undergo rapid modernization and industrialization, which led to a growing demand for resources and economic expansion. It was led perpetually by an Emperor who was seen as Divine. Its growth led to a growing demand for resources and economic expansion and this, with a growing sense of national pride, led to a desire to become a world power, with the belief that it had the right to claim and rule over other countries, including China and Southeast Asia. (Similar to so many other countries, e.g., Germany in the late 1800s; U.S. in the period 1865-1930s; China today.)
The first step in this process was the takeover of Manchuria, which became Manchuko.
During the 1930s, Japan took increasing expansionary steps in China, far greater than I realized. It bombed cities and pretty much took hold of the whole east coast.
This driving ideology of the right to claim a broader expanse of land has its parallel with Putin in Ukraine, a feeling that it (Ukraine) was part of Russia’s natural heritage.
3. If Japanese expansionist instincts were to have been thwarted, it would have to have been done early, I believe, likely with the takeover of Manchuria.
The colonialist attitude of the United States and Britain made these countries unwilling to draw a line in China against Japan. To the extent we objected to what Japan was doing, it was mainly to seek relief from any incursion by Japan into our own rights under the “Open Door” policy. Our own colonialist instincts played right into the hands of what Japan wanted to do.
4. I had not realized the depth of the internal conflict within Japan. There were individuals, more than just one or two, who saw Japan’s aligning itself with Germany, and joining the pact with Germany and Italy, to be a fatal mistake. They saw good relationships with the U.S. and Britain as fundamental. Yet, the group’s focus on expansion, including by military means, proved far stronger.
The Emperor, Hirohito, was opposed to the pact with Germany, but was finally worn down.
5. The only way that the drive for expansion and war, on the part of the Japanese, could have been stopped as the 1930s came to an end, was by the Emperor. His authority appears to have been complete. While not certain, if he had ruled that the leadership should pursue a strong relationship with the United States and insisted it abandon their expansionist drive, that probably would have happened. But he was not strong enough to do it, perhaps mentally or physically. This reminds me of how von Hindenburg was the only person who could have stopped the German decision to go to World War I. He could have thwarted Hitler, but he wasn’t strong enough or, for whatever reason, not inclined to do that.
6. There is no doubt that the increasing sanctions against Japan played a big role in their feeling they were being attacked by the “white man,” and had no choice in their view but to expand into countries where they could seize their own raw materials. Looking back, we applied these sanctions in a step-by-step, non-decisive way, and they led to an outcome that was the worst possible.
Similarly, the sanctions we are making against Russia are not having a decisive affect in their actions any more than they did with Japan. The history of sanctions as weapons to stop totalitarian expansion is not good.
7. I was reminded, in reading this book, how senior leaders, who had a right to know, foresaw precisely how, in an extended war, Japan was a sure loser—that it could not match the resources of the United States. Among these leaders was Yamamato, the admiral who led the attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew perfectly well that the likelihood of Japan prevailing in a war was close to zero. A true tragedy.
I think of the leadership in Germany pre-World War I and too some degree World War II. There, too, were people who foresaw the eventual result that Germany was on a suicidal mission. Yet, they were not united, and they could not prevail against the disciplined, passionate militaristic wing of German leadership. The same thing was true with our decision to pursue the war in Vietnam and invade Iraq in 2003. It has been this way all too often. (History may disclose there were strong leaders in the Kremlin who opposed Putin's decision to invade Ukraine. Yet, they did not prevail, just as those few in the US who foresaw Vietnam being a horrific mistake did not prevail).
No comments:
Post a Comment