Joseph Davies was the second ambassador to the Soviet Union, serving from 1936-38. He was 49 at the time; a practicing lawyer, defending companies against the government, quite successfully, most prominently the Ford Motor Company, which had been charged by the government with the requirement to pay back multi-millions. The government lost that case and ended up paying Ford several millions, resulting in the largest fee to a lawyer in history at that time.
I just finished reading his book, Mission to Moscow, published in 1941. It was very popular, selling 700,000 copies.
His description of the Soviet Union was deep, based on extensive travel orchestrated by the Soviet government. There is no doubt that he, like many other people, was taken by being “close to power.” He and his wife, Marjorie, were treated with careful and, from all appearances, sincere hospitality by President Litvinov and other officials.
He offered accolades to the Soviet government on the progress it had made during Stalin’s first five-year plan. Indeed, it was impressive, whether measured in infrastructure (e.g., railroads), building K-12 schools or universities, etc.
Davies’ attempted to bring “objectivity” to his task but I believe he far too kind in looking past the atrocities which were going on in his sight, including the “Trial of 20,” in which the defendants pled guilty (David felt genuinely; others weren’t so sure).
Davies was convinced, and in this I believe he was right, that there was a genuine affinity between Russian leadership, Russian people and the U.S.
He was convinced that “there were no conflicts of physical interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R….nothing that either has which is desired by or could be taken by the other.”
The U.S.S.R.’s fear of Germany was high; no less was its fear of Japan. As has been the case throughout its history, including in recent years, the U.S.S.R. felt under attack. It felt betrayed by Britain and other Western European countries as they “gave in” to Hitler’s demands, step by step. Both Stalin and Davies could see the ultimate outcome. Davies, presciently, warned President Roosevelt and the U.S. State Department that, unless they provided strong support for the U.S.S.R., there was every likelihood it would get into bed with Germany to protect itself. It was also clear to Davies before Germany’s attack on Poland that it would try to find a way to take the threat of a two-front war off the table by establishing a treaty with Russia, which, of course, is exactly what happened.
Davies was too sanguine—as I have been, too—in forecasting the future development of the U.S.S.R./Russia. He writes: “In my opinion, there is no danger from Communism, so far as the United States is concerned. To maintain its existence, the Soviet government has to continue to apply capitalistic principles. Otherwise, it will fail and be overthrown. That will not be permitted by the men presently in power, if they can avoid it.”
He expected the government to move “to the right in practice, just as it has for the past eight years. If it maintains itself, it may evolve into a type of Fabian socialism with large industry in the hands of the state, with the agricultural and smaller businesses and traders working under capitalistic, property and profit principles.”
He was right in what would happen to large industry; dead wrong in what happened to agriculture and the peasantry.
In the end, it can be argued he was proven right, with Perestroika introduced by Gorbachev and what followed, Russia has moved to a more “capitalistic” economic form. But it did so in a robber baron fashion, with the government (Putin) maintaining strong autocratic control of the kind Russia has embraced since the time of the tzars.
Following his return from his assignment in Russia and then later Belgium and Luxembourg, writing in 1941 just after Pearl Harbor, Davies offered this, addressing the concern that, in aiding Russia we might be creating a greater danger than Nazi Germany. “I shall mince no words,” he wrote, “certain Hitler stooges have been trying to frighten us into the belief that Communism would destroy our form of government if the Soviet Union defeats Hitler. That is just plain bunk. It is bad medicine. It is as unintelligent as it is unpatriotic and un-American.” Hitler had declaimed: “Peace of the world depends upon the domination of the world by the German race.”
That said it. Davies recognized correctly that “the government, the people and the armies of the Soviet Union stand between us in this fate (of being defeated by the Nazis).” Correct in his emphasis on priorities, Davies was far too sanguine, indeed naïve, in not recognizing the threat of Communism, distant though it was.
Davies’ naïve optimism, which was the outgrowth, I believe, of getting very close to a people and culture he had come to love, is perhaps best summarized by this: “It is bad Christianity, bad sportsmanship, bad sense to challenge the integrity of the Soviet government. Premier Stalin has repeatedly told the world that the Soviet government seeks no territory in this war. It does not seek to impose its will on other people. It fights only to liberate its own people and to give all people now enslaved by Nazi, fascist, or Japanese dictators the right to self-determination. The Soviet government has a record of keeping its treaty obligations equal to that of any nation on earth.”
Davies totally discounted the “so-called menace of Russian Communism” to American institutions. “I cannot see it,” he wrote, “our soil is not friendly to or ready for its seeds. Conditions certainly are not ripe for it yet, nor are conditions even possible to conceive that would be so bad, so desperate, as to cause our people to turn to Communism as a relief. We know our system of life and society is the best yet devised by man.”
In that statement he was, of course, right. And the threat of Communism was never as great as was broadcast by folks like Joe McCarthy in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s. But it was a threat well beyond what Davies envisaged.
It’s easy to criticize Davies in retrospect. Yet, others, most prominently Winston Churchill, had a more realistic view. I think Roosevelt did, too, though not one as clear as Churchill. This is an example of how all too easy it is for highly intelligent people of good will to underrate the hidden duplicitous ambitions and intentions of some people pretending to want good will and hold a commitment to peace far different than they harbor. On the other hand, there is another risk, probably equally dangerous. And that is to attribute malicious motivations to other people which they do not hold, at least to the degree we assert or fear. These convictions and the actions they lead to can, tragically, actually bring us or our countries on to the collision course which both want to avert.
In large measure, this was a driving force in the start of World War I. I fear in some measure, it characterizes our attitude and relations with China and Russia today. Food for careful thought.
Davies is a forgotten man today. Testimony to the humility with which we should pursue our lives-- realizing even more that the most important thing we can do is try to make a positive difference along the journey of life to people whose lives we touch.
