Eroding Confidence in Our Institutions; Some Personal Observations on Its Implications

May 15, 2019

The chart below documents what most of us have been reading about..and feeling. Some personal comments follow the chart.
How Much Confidence do You have in….(%)
(Gallup Poll)


Great deal/quite a lot
Very little/none
Church/Organized religion
2018
38
27

1993
53
17

1973
65
11




Supreme Court
2018
37
18

1993
43
17

1973
45
17




Congress
2018
11
48

1993
18
39

1973
42
14




Organized Labor
2018
26
25

1993
26
29

1973
30
24




Business
2018
25
30

1993
23
31

1973
26
29




Public Schools
2018
29
27

1993
39
23

1973
58
11




Newspapers
2018
23
40

1993
31
25

1973
39
18




TV News
2018
20
45

1993
46
18




Military
2018
74
5

1993
67
9

1973
58
12




Presidency
2018
37
44

1993
43
23

1973
52
16




Police
2018
54
15

1993
52
12

Confidence_GallupPoll051419

1. It is encouraging and appropriate that confidence in the military remains high, despite the challenge represented by the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a tribute to the men and women in our Armed Services. Also confidence in Police remains relatively high. 

2. The significant drop in confidence in the Congress reflects the bitter partisanship which has impeded collaborative action.This partisanship has been enabled in part by gerrymandering which leads to candidates not needing to meet the needs of the broad electorate to get elected. They need to win their party primaries which tend to push candidates to the extreme of their party's beliefs. Gerrymandering must be overturned. 

3. The sharp decline in confidence in the media (TV and newspapers) reflects the increasingly polarized reporting  made possible by the numerous media channels seeking discreet, loyal audiences. This contrasts to the days when the news was delivered through 3 or 4 major news networks each of which needed to appeal to a broad audience across the political spectrum. We urgently need media forms which objectively convey honest differences in points of view on key issues. 

4. The sharp decline in confidence in the Presidency in 2018 (especially the increase in negative comments) reflects the Trump presidency. 

5. The decline in confidence in public schools is deeply concerning, though separate research does show people to be significantly more positive about their OWN schools. 

6. The decline in confidence in church and organized religion mirrors a long term decline in people's attending religious services. I am not clear on the reasons for this. Scandals my account for part of it. More people (including some members of my own family) express the belief they are experiencing God and spirituality outside of church, for example in nature. 

7. Importantly, this broad decline in confidence in many of our institutions accentuates the importance of the family as the foundational institution  (which it has always been) for nurturing the sense of well being and community and mutual love and for conveying the values  of mutual respect which we aim to live by. 

We should take any and all action which bear on helping families achieve a sustainable existence. This will involve addressing the roots of poverty, support for early child care and development,  providing affordable health care for all, eliminating criminal justice policies which needlessly break up families and confronting the drug crisis. . 

I also believe this broad decline in institutional confidence, together with the desire of most if not all people to be associated with other people of high values, accentuates the importance of business leaders' pursuing a mission, and  taking actions and providing a value based environment which enlivens and realizes the commitment to do the right thing, for the business, the community and fellow employees. The role of business in promoting and actualizing the values by which we want to live is more important today than ever. 

William Burn's "The Back Channel" - The Finest Diplomatic Memoir I Have Ever Read

May 2, 2019

This is the best diplomatic memoir I have ever read. Informed, illuminating day-to-day events with amazing candor, including remarkably honest recognition of what the author (Burns) felt to be personal mistakes as well as those carried out by the State Department.

There were many confirmatory revelations for me.

The poorly considered and destructive impact of the expansion of NATO, the “killer” being the suggested expansion of the EU and likely then NATO to the Ukraine and Georgia. Putin and Russian’s of all stripes made it clear that this was a red line that could not be crossed.

Burns was in Moscow in 1995. He writes that Talbot as well as Secretary of Defense Bill Perry worried that starting down the road to form an enlargement of NATO would undermine hopes for a more enduring partnership with Russia undercutting reformers who would see it as a vote of no confidence in their efforts, a hedge against the likely failure of reform. “We shared similar concerns at Embassy Moscow. The challenge for us,” Burns wrote, in fall 1995, “is to look past the parent government of Russia’s often irritating rhetoric and the erratic and reactive diplomacy to our own long-term self interest. That demands, in particular, that we continue to seek to build a secure order in Europe sufficiently in Russia’s interests so that a revived Russia will have no compelling reason to revise it—and so that in the meantime the ‘stab in the back’ theorists will have only limited room for maneuver in Russian politics.” Sadly, we did not follow this advice.

For a time, we pursued the “Partnership for Peace,” a kind of NATO halfway house, but we did not pursue it aggressively, nor did Russia.

Putin’s increasing inclination to see a plot against him and Russia from almost every event, including protests about his decision to continue as president, is made abundantly clear.

Burns rightly describes Putin’s (and many Russians) intent as he writes “often as preoccupied with their sense of exceptionalism as Americans were, they sought a distinctive political and economic system, which would safeguard the individual freedoms and economic possibilities denied them under Communism, and ensure them a place among the handful of world powers.”

Burns continues with these personal words that I would echo: “I like Russians, respected their culture, enjoy their language and was endlessly fascinated by the tangled history of U.S.-Russian diplomacy.”

The history of our invidious inclination to pursue regime change is honestly described. Starting with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Iraq which Burns and most of the State Department vigorously opposed, including the war that precipitated it. He sadly writes: “Having lost the argument to avoid war, we had two main goals in shaping it and managing the inevitable risks.” They were going about “choosing between a smart way and a dumb way of bringing it (the regime change) about.” The Pentagon had taken over leadership from the State Department, together with Vice President Cheney and his office. 

The regime change went on in Libya with the overthrow of Kaddafi, not intended, but likely inevitable with the actions we took. A slippery slope it turned out to be. Not for the first time. 

Then we went on, with phone calls from Obama, telling Mubarak to step down in Egypt.

Elsewhere, Burns writes about his growing recognition of “the quality and increasing self-confidence of Chinese diplomacy.” That does not surprise me. It is exactly how I felt about Chinese leadership in the government and in business.

Burns tells the story of the negotiations which led to the anti-nuclear proliferation treaty with Iran in great detail. It was an extraordinary journey. Building of trust on both sides. Not perfect in the outcome, as Burns described it. They should have pushed for a longer period. But the best that could be obtained. This saga makes me doubly sorry that Trump pulled out of it. What a hit to our credibility, not just with Iran; but with our allies. 

Burns is brutally honest in his assessment of how he sees the state department needing to change in the future. He confesses to its being too “cautious, reactive and detached,” too bureaucratic, not effectively tied to the Hill, not adequately conveying the importance of diplomacy to the American public through illumination of the specific accomplishments it has enabled.

He advocates greater “candor and transparency (in describing)” the purpose and limits of American engagement abroad. “It is more effective to level with the American people about the challenges we face and the choices we make than to wrap them in the tattered robe of untampered exceptionalism or fan fears of external threats. Over promising and under delivery is the surest way to undermine the case for American diplomacy.”

Or anything else for that matter.

He advocates the importance of aligning our policies with “ensuring that the American middle class is positioned as well as possible for success in a hyper competitive world, that we build open and equitable trading systems, and that we don’t shy away from holding to account those who do not play by the rules of the game.”

I applaud his summation of our relationship with Russia. “A more durable 21st century European security architecture has alluded us in nearly three decades of fitful attempts to engage post-Cold War Russia that is not likely to change any time soon—certainly not during Putin’s tenure. Ours should be a long game strategy, not giving into Putin’s aggressive score settling, but not giving up on the possibility of an eventual mellowing of relations beyond him, nor can we afford to ignore the need for guardrails in managing an often adversarial relationship—sustaining communication between our militaries and our diplomats, and preserving what we can of a collapsing arms control architecture.” This is essential for the future of the world. 

I believe very much in what he wrote next. “Over time, Russia’s stake in healthy relations with Europe and Americana may grow, as a slow-motion collision with China and Central Asia looms.”

Burns’ book shares a lot of sad tales. Beyond those I have already mentioned, there is the description of the thwarted efforts to bring the Palestinians and Israelis together. Once again, Burns and most of the state department saw our policies which favored Israel and demoted the interests of Palestine as making the creation of a two-state solution unlikely to impossible. 

Here is a question which looms large to me in reading this memoir which Burns touches on but does not address directly: why were the State Department and its leaders unable to play a stronger role in making happen what they thought should happen.

To be sure, the outcomes were not totally bleak. While it has been unwound by the U.S, (but not the other signatories), the Iranian treaty was a diplomatic victory. So was the Paris Climate Treaty and, while he doesn’t talk about it at length, I’d imagine the Trans-Pacific Partnership was another. Tragically, all three of these accomplishments have been dismissed by the Trump administration. However, on other truly crucial events, the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of NATO with its impact on U.S.-Russia relations, Libya (though the state department as split on this), and Egypt, the beliefs of our most trained, experienced diplomats failed to carry the day.

One thing for sure. This argues for an extraordinarily strong Secretary of State. We had that in Jim Baker.

And that Secretary of State has to be respected by and aligned with a wise President. Again, we had that with Jim Baker and George H.W. Bush.
We need this in the next Administration. 

The Mueller Report--My Two Cents

April 29, 2019

I have spent about 3 hours reading the report. For what it is worth, here's my take:

1. It is extremely thorough and clearly presented. Balanced in its assessment.

2. While there are some redacted portions that one would like to see because of the context in which they occur, I come away believing we probably have enough information to form conclusions. 

3. The report convincingly established the direct and concerted involvement by Russia (GRU) in driving systematic interference in the 2016  Presidential election through a social media campaign favoring Trump and disparaging Clinton and by a computer-intrusion campaign against employees and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign. 

4.  While there were numerous points of contact between members of the campaign and various Russian leaders and while the members of the campaign did nothing to call attention to the Russian's interest in finding dirt on Hillary to be shared, I buy the conclusion that there is not evidence of outright collusion. 

5.  The instances of Trump trying to thwart the investigation and lying about doing it are numerous, intentional and deliberate and without pretending to render a legal judgment on criminality, they clearly show an intention by Trump to obstruct a proper investigation and therefore to obstruct justice. 

Viewed from the perspective of how I or any corporate leader would treat an executive who had done what Trump is shown to have done, the answer is clear. He/she would be terminated immediately.

Among the most flagrant actions, are these:

1. Repeated efforts made by Trump to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to remove the Special Counsel. This on top of this strong direction to McGhan to remove the Special Counsel in the first place. 

2. Trump's efforts to influence Manafort's testimony by offering him the prospect of a pardon.

3. Repeated efforts by Trump to have Sessions take control of the investigation, including by reversing his recusal, with the only logical intent being to achieve an outcome more likely to be in Trump's interest. 

4. Trump's efforts to have the investigation only concern itself with interference in future elections. 

It is hard for me to imagine facts emerging from further interviews with the principals that would materially change these conclusions.

Impeachment will not occur given the make-up of the Senate. Attempts to achieve it will not likely be productive against the main goal: getting Trump out of office in the 2020.  

I doubt if the general public will read this report in detail. 

I do not believe Trump supporters will change their  view of the situation based on any more information. 

Nevertheless, I believe that the cause of justice calls for doubling down through Congressional testimony on the one or two key areas of greatest Trump malfeasance which I would say are the interactions with McGhan. I would be focused. 

The candidates will be well served to stick as Biden has to the overall issue of character, a unifying vision for the country and the key issues such as health care and jobs and education impacting every day lives.