“The New Czar: The Rise
and Reign of Vladimir Putin” by Steven Lee Myers
This was a deeply informing and mind-opening book for me. The perspectives I take away from it
are many:
1.
It becomes even clearer to me that Putin’s
ascendency and with it his frame of mind changed event-by-event, yet inexorably
over the course of his life and especially over the 15 years, 2000-2015 during
which he has held power.
So much of his
history grew from his earliest background, as it does for all of us. Having been born into a war-ravaged
country, with his father at one point left for dead and two of his siblings
dying during World War II, having seen a movie in his teens that led him to
want to join the KGB and become a “spy,” having been bullied as a kid, and
later pursuing martial arts, learning that one has to fight for oneself, seeing
the West as a historic potential threat (witness the Cold War), with a life
driven by a pragmatic, “put your nose to the grindstone” commitment, while loyally
serving those in power (e.g. Sobchak) and being ready to make the most of what
comes next (I can relate to that).
In that regard,
nothing could have surprised him more looking back than Yeltsin’s asking him in
1999 to take his place as President.
2.
I believe Putin truly started out with one
overwhelming goal – to restore Russia’s stability and return it to
greatness. He had experienced the
ravages not only of the war but of the 1990s as the economy disintegrated.
Just before he
assumed the Presidency entering the year 2000, Putin spoke at the Kremlin on
New Year’s Eve saying, “unfortunately, not everyone in Western nations
understood this, but we will not tolerate any humiliation to the national pride
of Russia or any threat to the integrity of the country.”
Those fears were to
build incident by incident during the coming 15 years.
Still, he began
his Presidency wanting to become part of the West. This was reflected in his being the first leader to reach out
to President Bush right after the 9-11 terrorist attack. This manifested not only his desire to
reach out to the West but, above all, his fear of terrorism, of unrest, of
chaos, which he had experienced in many forms.
There is no
mistaking Putin’s passion or genuineness as he reacted to the news of the 9/11
bombing. He went on television and
expressed his condolences to the victims of what he called “an unprecedented
act of aggression..the event that occurred in the United States today goes
beyond national borders. It is a
brazen challenge to the whole of humanity, at least to civilized
humanity.” As Myers says in his
book, Putin made it clear that the tragedy was an opportunity to refashion into
national relations--to fight, in Putin’s words ‘the plague of the 21st
century..Russia knows first-hand what terrorism is, so we understand as well as
anyone the feelings of the American people. Addressing the people of the United States on behalf of
Russia,” Putin continued. “I would
like to say that we are with you, we entirely and fully share and experience
your pain.”
In a later
conversation with President Bush, Putin said it simply, “Good will triumph over
evil. I want you to know that in
this struggle, we will stand together.”
Words like these were not contrived.
There is no
overestimating in my view the impact on Putin of the multiple terrorist attacks
in Moscow, Beslan, Volgograd and other cities of Russia and then the brutal Chechnya
war. Maintaining the strength of
the state, including fighting off terrorism, in all its forms, became Putin’s
principal goal and that goal continues to this very day in Syria.
Putin’s view of the
importance of having a strong state, ensuring order over chaos, was manifested
clearly in a statement he made in 2003 referring to democracy: “If by Democracy, one means the
dissolution of the state, then we do not need such democracy. Why is democracy needed? To make people’s lives better, to make
them free. I don’t think there are
people in the world who want democracy that can lead to chaos.”
Clearly this line of
thinking was to find affirmation, as Putin saw in it, the tragic results growing
from the move toward what was hoped to be “democratization” in Iraq, Egypt,
Iraq and Libya.
Putin’s desire to
work constructively with the West had other manifestations. Myers writes in his book that Putin
invested heavily in developing a personal relationship with Bush. Already the first Russian or Soviet
leader since Lenin to speak a foreign language, he took lessons in English for
an hour a day, learning the language of American diplomacy and commerce, and he
used his rudimentary skill to speak privately with Bush to break the ice. In private, he felt he could be candid
with Bush about their differences, Myers writes, trying to make him understand
the difficulties that Russia—that he—faced in the transition from the Soviet
ruins. He sought some kind of
accommodation with the United States, even with NATO, Myers continues.
Against this
background, it is easy to understand how frustrated and disappointed Putin was
in Bush’s abandonment of the anti-missile defense treaty.
3.
Putin’s disenchantment with the West and his
increasing view that the U.S. and the West were “out to humble” Russia and exercise
a unilateral commitment to hegemony progressed through several stages. And so did the importance he attached
to the “nation state” and his deep abhorrence of what he saw as the unilateral
moves by the United States and the West to overthrow national leaders.
The expansion of
NATO into Central Europe, including the Balkans, and then to the Baltic states,
was not vigorously opposed, but it certainly was resented and came despite the
understanding (disputed by many in the West) that there had been an
understanding reached at the time of the unification of Germany that NATO would
not extend in the borders of what had been the German Democratic Republic. What tipped the scales far more was the
consideration given in 2007-08 to bring Georgia and Ukraine into the European
Union and, following that, even NATO.
The conflict in
Georgia precipitated by Georgia’s move into South Ossetia in 2008 was another
point of demarcation. Putin
clearly saw the U.S. having encouraged this initiative. And if it could happen in Georgia, it
could happen in Ukraine and maybe even Moscow. Another nail had been put in the mindset he was building.
Prior to that, at
the close of 2004, we had what became known as the “orange revolution” in
Ukraine. It was treated in Russia
as a humiliating defeat and as an ominous warning. Putin was convinced then, eight years before the Ukraine
crisis of 2013, that Western leaders had encouraged the mass protests in the
streets of Kiev. “We must not make
it an international practice to resolve disputes of this kind from street
riots.”
The first runoff of
the Presidential election in Ukraine had given the victory to Yanukowych, a
leader clearly committed to Russia.
Marked by a high degree of fraud, Ukraine’s highest court ordered a
runoff and Yushenko, strongly supportive of the West, won the election.
This coincided with
President Bush’s now advancing what he described as “the freedom agenda” as he
cheered the popular uprisings in Georgia and Ukraine. To recent elections in Iraq, Bush said, “we are part of the
inevitable march of democracy that had begun with the Velvet Revolution in the
then unified Czechoslovakia in 1989.”
Without mentioning Russia, Bush declared that “eventually the call of
liberty comes to every mind and every soul. And one day, freedom’s promise will reach every people in
every nation.” Without intending
to, I’m sure, Bush’s words led Putin to believe that similar efforts might even
be undertaken in Russia.
Ukraine’s election
came the week of terrorist attacks in Russia and, in Myers view, “proved to be
a turning point for Putin and for Russia.” Putin’s initial instinct to bring Russia into closer
cooperation with the West, if not an actual alliance, had faded as steadily as
his political and economic power had grown.
In 2007, at Davos,
he spoke without, as he said, “excessive politeness and the need to speak in
roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. Today, we are witnessing in a most uncontained, hyper use of
force—military force—into international relations, a force that is plunging the
world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” He singled out the United States which had “overstepped its
national borders in every way.
This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational
politics it imposes on other nations.
Well, who likes this?” The
dye had been cast.
And then you had
the Ukraine crisis itself which I needn’t go through here. Putin viewed the riots which led to
Yanukovych’s departure and the entry of the new provisional government as
having been advanced by the U.S. and the West and indeed it had been. By now, Putin’s review of the history
of the past decade had become a fixation, and in many ways a paranoia.
4.
Syria—Russia’s position on Syria and what is
happening right now was totally predictable. Here again Putin saw the U.S. and the West setting out to
overthrow a national leader. As
Myers writes, “Putin had little personal sympathy for Assad; what he vehemently
opposed was another American-led attack in the Middle East. He was convinced that from the
beginning the United States had been waiting for any pretext to attack and
topple Assad.”
By now, Putin had
the evidence that he could point to as confirming his belief. I refer to the actions taken to
intervene in Serbia (Milosevic), Iraq (overturning Hussein), Egypt (Mubarak),
Libya (Khadafi) and Tunisia. Each
had unleashed sectarian violence.
Adding to his
motivation in Syria, perhaps the most important element was Putin’s deep
concern about ISIS terrorism that could flow over into Russia. Here, in Syria, Putin had the melding
of all that was needed to undertake a righteous mission: the maintenance of the rule of law,
national sovereignty and a fight against terrorism of a kind he had fought
against almost non-stop and with the very integrity of Russia at stake as he
looked back for over 15 years.
Increasingly, President Putin saw himself upholding a value system being
compromised by the West.
In 2013, fresh from
his diplomatic triumph in reaching an agreement to remove Syria’s chemical
weapons without warfare, Putin described the “Euro-Atlantic countries” as
dangerously adrift from their Christian roots. “They are denying moral principles and all traditional
identities: national, cultural,
religious and even sexual. Worse,
he said, these nations want to export these dangerous ideas.” It was “a direct path to degradation
and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis.”
5.
Stepping back, there is no question that for
Russia to have a healthy, growing economy, and for the entire world to be safe,
Russia needs constructive, non-adversarial relationships with the U.S. and the West.
At a minimum, we
need to:
·
Avoid a further breakdown the relationships
between Russia and the U.S. This
means that we must work together to resolve what are the open wounds now in
Ukraine and Syria; both require a political settlement which requires Russia
and the U.S. (and others) to be at the table, and the defeat of ISIS.
·
Come together to identify what are the common
interests which Russia and the U.S. and others must work to achieve. Interests so important and so requiring
Russia and the U.S. to work together that we must form a common goal and
plan. Those for me are two-fold:
o
Avoiding the risk of nuclear proliferation and
disaster.
o
Combatting terrorism, starting with but not
exclusively combatting ISIS
We are going to need
to accept the fact that values as they relate to the mode of democracy and cultural
issues such as same-sex marriage will be different in Russia than the U.S.,
just as they are different in parts of our own country and have differed over
time. We must avoid seeming to or
actually working to impose our values on Russia. We must acknowledge Russia as a major global power, with a
history and status that deserve and demand respect. We must dial down the rhetoric which vilifies the other
party when what they are doing is essentially expressing their own national
interest and pride as we do. Such
rhetoric runs the grave risk of creating “self-fulfilling” negative
outcomes—“mythical enemies”—distracting us from the real enemies in front of
us.
At the same time, we
should make it clear that we will not stand by and allow Russia or any country
to infringe upon the integrity of another national state like Ukraine. Indeed, that position on our part mirrors
that which has been driving Putin and Russia as they express it.
We should be under
no illusion that Putin’s mindset and deeply entrenched attitudes will change quickly. They are the product of decades of
experience. To the degree they
change—and I for one believe they can--they will change based on actions and
behaviors on both our parts as we work together on objectives of common
interest. Most importantly, at
this moment, combatting ISIS and reaching political settlement that brings
greater stability and peace to Ukraine and Syria and other countries of the
Middle East.
Yes, Putin’s mindset
had evolved, slowly but surely, block on block. As Myers writes, “each step against Russia, he now believed
to be a cynical, calculated attack against him. His actions belied a deep sense of grievance and betrayal,
sharpened by the crisis that unfolded (in Ukraine) at the very moment Russia
had achieved its Olympic dream (referring to the Sochi Olympics). It was as if a political upheaval in Ukraine
affected Putin deeply and personally, like a taunt on the schoolyard that
forced him to lash out. For 14
years, Myers continues, Putin had focused on restoring Russia to its place
among the world’s powers by integrating into a globalized economy (and),
profiting from…the financial institutions of the free market. Now, Myers continues, “he would
reassert Russia’s power with or without the recognition of the West, shunning
its ‘universal’ values, its democracy and rule of law, as something alien to Russia,
something intended not to include Russia but to subjugate it.”
As he winds to his
conclusion, Myers greatly simplifies and overstates matters and, most
importantly, I believe, misconstrues Putin’s pragmatic mindset and willingness
to be flexible in order to achieve what in the end is his main goal: a successful, economically thriving,
respected Russian state, looked at and treated as a partner in critical world
matters.
I believe Putin
understands that it will only be through a coalition of forces, prominently
including the United States, that terrorism can be beaten, nuclear
proliferation avoided and economic progress optimized.
I am convinced that
if we were able to bring leaders together, to undertake specific goals,
including combatting terrorism and taking steps to control the threat of nuclear
annihilation, we can progress. It
has always been human nature that we come together best when we face a common
enemy. Unlike the past, we do not
have ideological differences with Russia (as we do with ISIS) that should lead
to war or that by their very nature lead to competing commitments to global
expansion.
J.
E. Pepper
